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Territorial Integrity Treaties, Uti Possidetis, and 
Armed Conflict over Territory 
 
Abstract: A recent article suggests that a norm of territorial integrity spread rapidly across the globe 
during the twentieth century.  While the successful acquisition of territory by force has become 
much less frequent, though, there have been numerous attempts to acquire territory by force during 
this time, and there appear to be several different types of obligations in territorial integrity treaties.  
Drawing from the content of treaties with territorial integrity provisions, we reconceptualize the 
norm to distinguish between treaties guaranteeing territorial integrity in a general sense and those 
that only proscribe the acquisition of territory by force, and we examine an important precursor in 
the nineteenth-century Latin American norm of uti possidetis juris.  We find that both norms seem 
to have been associated with generally increased low-level conflict over territory but (at least for 
general territorial integrity obligations and for the Latin American states that developed uti 
possidetis) less of the more intense forms of conflict. 
 
 In a recent article, Zacher (2001) discusses a territorial integrity norm that spread across the 
globe in the twentieth century.  He describes this norm, encapsulated first in the League of Nations 
Covenant and more recently in the United Nations Charter and numerous regional treaties, as 
rejecting attempts to change the territorial status quo through the threat or use of force.  Zacher's 
evidence suggests that once the norm became widespread, there were relatively few cases of 
successful territorial aggrandizement in the first three decades since World War II, and none since 
the mid-1970s. 
 Although Zacher's evidence initially seems persuasive, this norm appears to involve more 
than just the avoidance of successful challenges to the territorial status quo; any attempt to acquire 
territory forcibly -- whether ultimately successful or not -- would seem to violate the norm.  While 
there have been relatively few cases of successful territorial aggrandizement since World War II, 
Zacher notes forty such attempts during this peaceful period.  Furthermore, many of the 
international treaties that include territorial integrity provisions offer blanket guarantees of 
signatories' territorial integrity, not just condemnation of the forcible acquisition of territory.  We 
thus reconceptualize the territorial integrity norm to distinguish between general guarantees of 
territorial integrity and the rejection of force for acquiring territory, each of which appears in 
numerous multilateral treaties. 
 Another important consideration in the study of territorial integrity norms is the early 
development of this norm before the twentieth-century period that Zacher emphasizes.  After 
Spain's former Latin American colonies achieved their independence in the early nineteenth century, 
they adopted the legal doctrine of uti possidetis de jure or uti possidetis juris, under which the 
region's colonial-era administrative borders would be elevated to international borders separating the 
newly independent states.  This doctrine was an important precursor to the territorial integrity norm 
that Zacher describes as taking root worldwide a century later.  Some scholars credit uti possidetis 
with the reduction of territorial conflict in Latin America, although others argue that it either failed to 
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prevent territorial conflict or made it worse.   
 In this paper, we examine the global territorial integrity norm (in its general and violent 
manifestations) and the earlier uti possidetis norm for post-colonial Latin America over two 
centuries of history.  We trace the historical development of each norm in narrative form, and 
discuss how to measure each empirically through treaty commitments.  We then examine the impact 
of each norm on several forms of territorial conflict.  Our results suggest that each norm has had at 
best a mixed impact, with general territorial integrity obligations reducing territorial conflict but 
violent obligations actually associated with increased low-level conflict over territory.  The Latin 
American uti possidetis norm also seems to have been associated with increased low-level conflict 
over territory when compared to similar territorial claims elsewhere in the world, although the most 
intense conflicts were less likely in Latin America; we have found little evidence that this norm's 
effects strengthened over time.  We conclude by discussing possible directions for future research 
in this area, focusing on other dimensions of uti possidetis in Latin America as well as on 
applications to other parts of the world. 
 
Studying Territorial Integrity Norms 
 Our conceptualization of international norms follows Krasner’s (1982: 186) definition as 
“ standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. ” Like Florini (1996: 364-365), 
we emphasize "the sense of 'ought'" and the notion of legitimate behavior, which distinguish norms 
from observable behavioral regularities.  We also recognize the importance of identity in norms, 
following Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998: 891) definition of a norm “as a standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity;” norms do not necessarily apply to all states in the 
international system.  A systematic analysis of a given norm must thus indicate which general class 
of behavior is addressed by the norm, which specific behaviors within this general class are 
considered legitimate, and which actors are governed by this standard or in which situations. 
 It is also important to be able to measure the strength of the norm over time, in order to 
examine its impact on national behavior.  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895-905) describe the 
strength of norms as evolving through a "life cycle" of three stages.  In the norm emergence stage, 
norm entrepreneurs (typically private citizens, often with organizational platforms to help spread 
their message) attempt to convince state leaders to follow their desired norm.  In the norm cascade 
stage, the "norm leaders" -- states that have accepted the norm -- attempt to socialize other states to 
accept the norm and become "norm followers."  Some budding norms may fail in either the 
emergence or cascade stages, if the entrepreneurs or norm leaders are unable to convince enough 
states to follow them.  Norms that pass through the first two stages reach the norm internalization 
stage, by the end of which "norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of 
broad public debate." (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895)  This notion of a life cycle encourages 
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scholars to think in terms of the evolving strength of a norm over time, allowing systematic analysis 
of the impact of the norm on international behavior. 
 Working from insights such as these, a great deal of normative scholarship has emerged in 
the past two decades, offering systematic examination of norms pertaining to decolonization 
(Goertz and Diehl 1992), alliance commitments (Kegley and Raymond 1982), and pacific dispute 
settlement between democracies (e.g., Dixon 1993; Mitchell 2001).  In a recent article, Zacher 
(2001) extends this list by suggesting that the past two centuries have seen the development of an 
important international norm against territorial changes.  We now examine Zacher's characterization 
of this norm, before offering our own refinement of what the twentieth-century territorial integrity 
nom includes and then extending this basic norm back to the concept of uti possidetis in nineteenth-
century Latin America. 
 
Zacher’s Territorial Integrity Norm 
According to Zacher (2001: 215), the territorial integrity norm refers to "the growing respect 
for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries."  Zacher (2001: 
216-221) describes this norm as developing out of the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century.  
Before that time, territories frequently changed hands with the expansion or contraction of states 
and empires, as rulers sought to acquire more land for the purposes of increasing their own security 
and/or wealth; the inhabitants of the territories were not considered during the process.  As 
nationalism developed, though, a norm began to take shape that opposed transferring one state's 
people to rule by another state.1  He later describes the spread of the norm as being driven by 
Western democracies and reflecting such factors as the association of territorial revisionism with 
major wars (most notably in the two world wars), liberalism's emphasis on national self-
determination, and for nondemocratic states the changing costs and benefits of territorial 
aggrandizement (2001: 238-244). 
Zacher (2001: 236) writes that the emergence phase of the territorial integrity norm began 
with the end of World War I, and lasted through the end of World War II.  The norm began to take 
concrete form with the debate over the post-World War I peace settlement, and it was featured in 
one of Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points:  "specific covenants for the purpose of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
                                                
1 Ironically, this norm may have sown the seeds for turmoil in certain situations.  While the norm 
argues against transferring control of one's own kinsmen to a foreign power, it could also be 
manipulated to justify a territorial claim to territory populated by one's kinsmen under a foreign 
ruler.  Zacher (2001: 219, 229, 239) recognizes this, noting (p. 244) that states’ concerns for 
protecting their nationals abroad “cannot be squelched, but it is much more difficult now for states 
to embark on attempts to protect and absorb fellow nationals in foreign states when their civil rights 
are respected.”  
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states alike."  The norm was first encapsulated in Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant: 
"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."  After World 
War I, Zacher (2001: 220-221) notes, the norm was applied unevenly; there were numerous 
transfers of territory from the defeated Central Powers, and the norm's supporters did little to 
oppose German, Italian, and Japanese conquests before the 1939 German invasion of Poland.  By 
the end of World War II, though, the major democratic powers -- Britain, France, and the United 
States -- followed the norm much more closely, generally rejecting territorial gains at the expense of 
the defeated Axis; only Russia of the main Allied powers took large pieces of Axis territory.   
Zacher (2001: 236-237) describes the acceptance stage of the norm (or the cascade stage in 
Finnemore and Sikkink's terminology) as beginning with the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter and lasting until the mid-1970s: "It was not until the 1960s and early 1970s that broad and 
strong backing for the norm became palpable."  Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 
explicitly proscribed the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state, and 
similar principles soon began to be included in the charters of regional organizations such as the 
OAS and OAU as well as in other multilateral agreements such as the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act 
(Zacher 2001: 221-223, 237).  Finally, Zacher (2001: 237) describes the institutionalization or 
strengthening stage of the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink's internalization stage) as running from 
1976 to the present, when third parties have become involved in territorial conflicts to ensure that 
force does not lead to the successful acquisition of territory. 
In order to determine the impact of the norm, Zacher (2001: 223-224) examines a list of 
major military conflicts the occurred between 1648-2000.  This list includes 93 wars between 1648-
1945 that involved territorial issues, and 40 more between 1946-2000.  Of these territorial wars, 
approximately 80 percent before 1945 led to the redistribution of territory, as compared to only 30 
percent between 1946-2000.  The number of territorial redistributions per year has also dropped 
substantially over time, particularly when controlling for the number of states in the international 
system; the rate of redistribution since World War II is less than half as in the nineteenth century, 
and one-fifth as much as in the first half of the twentieth century.2  Importantly, Zacher (2001: 237) 
also reports that during the institutionalization stage of the norm's development (1975-2000) there 
has not been a single major case of successful territorial aggrandizement. 
Zacher's evidence appears persuasive initially, even if he notes (2001: 224) that "the criteria 
for the inclusion of wars differs for the pre- and post-1945 years, and there is no claim of statistical 
significance."  Yet we have several concerns with Zacher's analysis of a territorial integrity norm.  
                                                
2 Zacher (2001: 224) notes, however, that "the criteria for the inclusion of wars differs for the pre- 
and post-1945 years, and there is no claim of statistical significance."  He does suggest, though, that 
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We are concerned with the identification of a single norm, when analysis of the relevant treaties and 
documents suggests two distinct norms related territorial integrity -- one preserving the territorial 
integrity of all states, and one rejecting the threat or use of force against territorial integrity but 
permitting peaceful territorial change.  We also suggest that closer attention needs to be paid to the 
behavior that is studied to evaluate the impact of the norm(s) in question.  While successful 
territorial aggrandizement should indeed count as evidence against a territorial integrity norm, we 
believe that the outbreak of armed conflict over territory (even if unsuccessful) should count against 
a norm proscribing violent territorial change.3   
 
Reconceptualizing Territorial Integrity Norms 
 We believe that instead of a single territorial integrity norm as described by Zacher, several 
different territorial integrity norms have been featured in multilateral treaties and institutions.  Some 
treaties have specifically proscribed the acquisition of territory through the threat or use of military 
force; this was the primary focus of Zacher (2001), as discussed above.  Others encapsulate the 
notion of territorial integrity more generally, without any explicit limitation to the rejection of 
forcible changes in territory.  Because these latter treaties do not explicitly limit the territorial 
integrity obligation to rejection of violent transfers of territory, they appear to be a broader and more 
comprehensive norm against territorial change, and they may be expected to have different 
consequences for international behavior. 
 The first treaty with a territorial integrity obligation, the League of Nations Covenant, 
proscribed the violent acquisition of territory in Article 10: "The Members of the League undertake 
to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the League."  Most other early efforts to encapsulate territorial 
integrity provisions in multilateral treaties followed similar approaches; details of each treaty are 
provided in Appendix I.4  Such treaties include the Saavedra Lamas Pact and Montevideo 
                                                                                                                                                       
these figures point to an important change in patterns of territorial conflict. 
3 For example, Zacher notes that force has been much less successful at acquiring territory since 
1945, and that there have been no successful cases of territorial aggrandizement since 1976.  Yet his 
data set indicates that forty territorial conflicts began between 1945-2000, and Table 2 in his paper 
indicates that thirteen of these conflicts began between 1976-2000. The fact that force is used over 
territory so frequently would appear to constitute evidence against a norm against the acquisition of 
territory by force, even if these attempts have generally failed. Furthermore, during this same time, 
Huth (1996) identifies 129 distinct territorial disputes between states, although not all of these 
became militarized during this time.  The fact that so many states seek territorial revisions (albeit not 
always by force) seems to cast doubt on the effectiveness of a global norm of territorial integrity. 
4 This list is based on the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement data set, which is limited to 
treaties and institutions that contain at least five member states.  Zacher (2001) lists several other 
treaties or documents as examples of territorial integrity norms that we do not include, because we 
do not believe that they qualify.  For example, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and Pact of the League of 
 6 
 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States in 1930s Latin America, the United Nations Charter and 
the OAS Charter after World War II, and the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression and SADC 
Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation in contemporary Africa.  In each case, the 
emphasis was on preventing war over territory, while still allowing peaceful transfers of territory by 
mutual agreement; as will be seen, this approach is consistent with the Latin American application of 
uti possidetis. 
 More recently, though, there has been a trend toward more general respect for territorial 
integrity provisions, with no explicit limitation to the proscription of violent acquisition of territory.  
The first such effort was the Locarno Pact (Pact of Mutual Guarantee) in interwar Europe, which 
sought to prevent Germany from challenging its western borders with France and Belgium.  In 
Article 1 of this pact , the signatory states guaranteed "the maintenance of the territorial status quo 
resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and 
the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at 
Versailles on June 28, 1919."  German demands for territory through the threat or use of force were 
clearly banned by this document, but so were peaceful demands for territorial revision; the pact was 
intended to prevent any challenge to the Versailles settlement in Western Europe.5     
 The Locarno Pact was the only such general territorial integrity obligation for more than 
three decades, until the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s. The borders between European 
colonies in Africa were often unnatural, cutting across traditional ethnic or linguistic groups and 
producing ill-fitting multiethnic colonial entities.  As a result, leaders in the region chose to avoid 
uncertainty and conflict by preserving their existing colonial boundaries; it was feared that allowing 
challenges to any African borders on the grounds of illegitimacy could lead to the emergence of 
challenges against virtually every African border for the same reason. (Malanczuk 1997: 162; 
Ratner 1996: 595-596; Zacher 2001: 221-223) The OAU Charter thus contained explicit support 
for territorial integrity in this general sense, rather than simply preventing the violent transfer of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Arab States both renounce war and call for the peaceful settlement of disputes, but neither document 
specifically mentions territorial integrity -- and the Arab League document explicitly rejects 
applying the League's obligatory peaceful settlement mechanism to territorial questions between 
members.  Zacher (2001: 221) also describes decolonization as an example of this norm, listing 
1960 and 1970 UN documents on decolonization because they called for the independence of entire 
colonies rather than the self-determination of each individual ethnic or tribal group.  Yet this is not 
fully consistent with the territorial integrity norm that he describes throughout his paper, which 
concerns the rejection of territorial acquisition of new territory by force. 
5 Bell (1997: 36-37) notes that the Locarno Pact had great symbolic value in "confirming the 
territorial settlement in western Europe on a freely negotiated basis," and Gilbert (1984: 221-222) 
noting that in the eyes of the participants "the frontiers between Germany, France, and Belgium -- 
and the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland -- were now recognized as final."  In proposing 
and signing this pact, Germany refused to accept its post-Versailles eastern borders with Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, but even those borders could not be challenged militarily. 
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territory.  Article 2 listed one of the purposes of the organization as "To defend [the African states'] 
sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence," while Article 3 elaborated by declaring 
adherence to the principle of "Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and 
for its inalienable right to independence existence."  Similar provisions subsequently appeared in 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference's Charter, CSCE's Helsinki Final Act, and ASEAN's 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia during the 1970s; SAARC Charter and Andean 
Community's Declaration of Galápagos in the 1980s; the charters of the CIS and the CICA in the 
1990s; and charters or treaties associated with the GUAM, SEECP, SCO, CSTO, and ECCAS in 
the 2000s. 
 This distinction between violent and general territorial integrity obligations appears to be 
important.  Most early efforts, such as those embodied in the League of Nations and United 
Nations as well as in several Latin American treaties, accepted the possibility of peaceful territorial 
change while opposing the acquisition of territory through violent or coercive means.  In cases such 
as Locarno and the OAU, though, even peaceful change was seen as a serious threat, and the 
existing borders (whether created through Versailles or through colonization) were not to be 
challenged through either peaceful or military means.  If the explicit content of a norm is to be taken 
as a guide to the norm's intended effects, it appears reasonable to offer the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Militarized challenges to territory should be less likely when there is a stronger 
territorial integrity norm, including both violent and general territorial integrity provisions. 
Hypothesis 2:  Violent transfers of territory should be less likely when there is a stronger 
territorial integrity norm, including both violent and general territorial integrity provisions. 
Hypothesis 2a:  Transfers of territory through peaceful methods should be less likely when there 
is a stronger territorial integrity norm, as reflected in general territorial integrity provisions; 
violent territorial integrity provisions should have little impact. 
 
The Latin American Uti Possidetis Norm 
 Although Zacher dates the emergence stage of the modern territorial integrity norm as 
beginning with the signing of the League of Nations Covenant, it had an important predecessor in 
the Western Hemisphere.6  The legal doctrine of uti possidetis juris or uti possidetis de jure is 
                                                
6 Zacher recognizes uti possidetis as a precursor of the global territorial integrity norm, and notes 
(2001: 229) that "While the principle was not respected by all countries in the region throughout 
the nineteenth century, it had some impact in promoting greater order in the region."  He omits this 
doctrine from his main analysis, though, because "the Latin American states were marginal to the 
system in the nineteenth century."  While this doctrine may have been an important precedent 
behind the twentieth-century rise of the territorial integrity in Europe and then elsewhere, then, it had 
little contemporary influence on the behavior of states outside of Latin America. 
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defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “The doctrine that old administrative boundaries will 
become international boundaries when a political subdivision achieves independence” (Garner 
1999: 1544; see also Prescott 1987: 105-106, Ratner 1996). The basic principle dates to Roman 
times and takes its name from the Latin phrase “uti possidetis, ita possideatis,” or “as you 
possess, so may you possess”  (e.g., Lalonde 2002: Chapter 1; Shaw 1996: 98). 
 The modern uti possidetis doctrine emerged after the decolonization of Latin America in the 
early 19th century. This doctrine was summarized in the 1922 arbitral award by the Swiss Federal 
Council that settled the territorial claim between Colombia and Venezuela, which described uti 
possidetis as "the basis of South American public law": 
 
When the Spanish colonies of Central and South America proclaimed their independence in 
the second decade of the nineteenth century, they adopted a principle of constitutional and 
international law to which they gave the name of uti possidetis juris of 1810.  The principle 
laid down the rule that the boundaries of the newly established republics would be the 
frontiers of the Spanish provinces which they were succeeding,  This general principle 
offered the advantage of establishing the general rule that in law no territory of old Spanish 
America was without an owner. (...) The principle also had the advantage, it was hoped, of 
doing away with boundary disputes between the new states. (Scott 1922: 428-429) 
 
Under this doctrine, each state in the region was to be recognized as possessing all territories that 
were presumed to be possessed by its colonial predecessor as of 1810 (for South America) or 1821 
(for Central America), reflecting the last periods of unchallenged Spanish rule (and thus the last 
times that borders could be considered to have been under Spanish authority).  Much like the 
Monroe Doctrine proclaimed by the United States, this doctrine was intended to prevent new claims 
to Latin American territory by extra-regional states, because the entire continent was already 
considered to be under the sovereignty of independent states.  Furthermore, there should be little or 
no territorial conflict among the Latin American states themselves because of the clear identification 
of each border’s location based on colonial-era administrative lines -- although the doctrine was 
generally treated as a starting point for determining borders, allowing two parties to depart from the 
colonial-era administrative boundaries through mutual agreement if desired (Brownlie 1998: 133; 
Castellino 2000: 63ff, 142-143; Ireland 1938: 327-329; Lalonde 2002: 28 ff; Ratner 1996: 593-
595, 598-601; Sharma 1997: 119-129; Shaw 1996: 141-150; Shaw 1997: 216).7   
                                                
7 There is some disagreement about the relative importance of the intraregional and extraregional 
elements in the development of uti possidetis in Latin America. Shaw (1996: 98) argues that "the 
real thrust of the doctrine as developed in Latin America was external rather than internal.  It was 
intended to prevent any renewal of European colonization on the basis that parts of the continent 
constituted terrae nullius and thus were open to acquisition of sovereignty by effective occupation 
by any State."  He goes on to argue that the primary application of the doctrine would later evolve to 
be concerned primarily with the prevention of settlement of boundary disputes between Latin 
American states (Shaw 1996: 99-100).  Castellino and Allen (2003: 63) suggest, though, that the 
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 While numerous scholars recognize the Latin American application of uti possidetis and 
describe it in similar terms, though, it is very difficult to pinpoint when the norm first emerged, or to 
measure its changing strength over time.  This principle was not embodied in any Spanish treaties 
or documents, but evolved over the nineteenth century at the initiative of the new Latin American 
leaders, who sought to maintain their independence and consolidate their rule. These leaders held a 
number of multilateral conferences that considered similar proposals related to uti possidetis, often 
centering around a regional confederation or alliance against extraregional threats as well as seeking 
to manage or avoid intraregional territorial problems.  While many of these conferences produced 
treaties, none received the needed ratifications to take legal effect.  Nonetheless, the content of these 
various treaties offers insight into the evolving understanding of uti possidetis in Latin America. 
 
Norm Emergence 
 The norm emergence stage for uti possidetis – when norm entrepreneurs attempt to 
convince state leaders to follow the desired norm -- can be described as beginning around the time 
of independence from Spain, when some norm entrepreneurs began to proclaim the norm but it was 
not widely accepted. For example, Chilean statesmen laid out the basic principle in 1810 in a 
proposal for a confederation of sovereign states, with the goal of uniting to defend against external 
threats as well as to prevent wars among themselves.  Nothing came of this proposal, though 
(Alvarez 1909: 276; Castellino and Allen 2003: 67-68). 
 The next effort was the 1826 Panama Congress, convened by Simón Bolívar, the leader of 
Gran Colombia who had been instrumental in defeating the Spanish.  Bolívar sought to create a 
confederation of independent states, which would be able to defeat any Spanish return to the region 
as well as resolving conflicts among the member states.  This Congress produced a Treaty of 
Union, League, and Perpetual Confederation between Mexico, Central America, Gran Colombia, 
and Peru. This pact emphasized common defense against Spain, and included guarantees of the 
members' sovereignty and territorial integrity against foreign powers' attempts to colonize or 
establish settlements.  It also renounced the use of force among the confederated states, and 
provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the confederation.  Finally, 
once the members had reached mutually agreeable borders, the confederation was to guarantee 
intraregional territorial integrity, although this is distinguished from the traditional uti possidetis 
                                                                                                                                                       
intraregional element was also quite important in the early development of the doctrine, because the 
fledgling states recognized that boundary disputes between the new states were likely because of the 
manner in which they had been administered by the Spanish: "Internally it was important for the 
Creoles to come to some agreement amongst themselves with regard to the extent of their territorial 
limits so as to prevent infighting and forceful renegotiation of boundaries between themselves.  
Accordingly it was necessary to build the geographical parameters of the new state into its 
constitution to forestall territorial disputes that might arise between states." 
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doctrine by the lack of discussion of colonial borders and the postponement of the guarantee until 
the borders had been settled by the parties themselves (Alvarez 1909: 277-279; Bächler 1975: 289-
290; Bächler 1976: 233-234; Castellino and Allen 2003: 68-69; Inman 1965: 8-11; Kunz 1953: 
660-666).  After the 1826 treaty failed to attract the needed ratifications, numerous other efforts 
were made to convene a new conference, including seven unsuccessful Mexican efforts between 
1831-1842 and several Chilean efforts in the 1840s (Inman 1965: 20-21; Marcus 1952: 187-189; 
Nuermberger 1940: 32). 
 While uti possidetis may not have been formalized in the first years after independence, 
Ireland (1938: 327) argues that the first post-Spanish juntas in Latin America "seemed to recognize 
the general frontiers of their jurisdiction at the boundaries of the former governments in whose 
capitals they were functioning, and tacitly to recognize the mutual advantages of such limitations."  
Over the coming years, the constitutions of some Latin American states declared their borders as 
following the lines of the states' respective Spanish colonial predecessors (Alvarez 1909: 290; 
Bächler 1975: 314-324; Lalonde 2002: 29-30).  For example, Colombia's 1819 constitution (when 
the new Colombian state included both New Granada and Venezuela) declared that its territories 
"shall be those comprehended in the former Captain-generalship of Venezuela and the Vice-royalty 
of the New Kingdom of Granada... whereof the exact boundaries shall be fixed at a more 
seasonable opportunity"; similar provisions can be found in the early constitutions of Mexico, Peru, 
Bolivia, Venezuela, the Republic of Central America, Honduras, and El Salvador. References to 
colonial borders were also written into numerous border treaties between former Spanish colonies; 
Bächler (1975: 295-314) notes eighteen such treaties in the nineteenth century alone, as well as 
others during the twentieth century or with such partners as Brazil or Spain.8 
 
Norm Cascade 
 The norm cascade stage in the development of uti possidetis – when states that have 
accepted the norm attempt to socialize other states to accept it as well -- began with the 1847-1848 
Congress of Lima, which was the first multilateral effort that we are aware of that explicitly 
addresses the intraregional dimension of territorial integrity.  This congress produced a Treaty of 
Confederation between New Granada, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile.  Article 7 sought to prevent 
                                                
8 While numerous constitutions and treaties referred to colonial referents while defining national 
territories or determining international borders, Lalonde (2002: 33-34) notes that only four Costa 
Rican constitutions among the more than eighty nineteenth-century Latin American constitutions 
explicitly mentioned the phrase uti possidetis, as did only five of 127 border treaties that she 
consulted.  Even the 1848 Treaty of Confederation -- widely regarded as proclaiming the uti 
possidetis principle -- does not mention this principle by name.  Lalonde uses this absence of this 
specific phrase to argue against the common conclusion that uti possidetis had much influence on 
Latin American leaders, although we (like most others) are satisfied that the frequent reference to 
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hemispheric solidarity from being disrupted by border issues between the Latin American states, 
leading to a declaration that (in the absence of special arrangements by the interested parties 
themselves) borders should be those that the respective countries had possessed at the time of their 
independence from Spain.  Other provisions called for mediation by other signatories in the event 
of serious problems that may arise, particularly over territorial questions, and for arbitration of 
issues that could not otherwise be resolved peacefully.  Most controversially, Article 8 demanded 
that before territories could be united, separated, or acquired by confederation members, the 
involved parties would have to declare that the change was not prejudicial to the confederation's 
interests and security, and the action would be subject to the confederation's veto (Alvarez 1909: 
280-283; Bächler1975: 290-293; Bächler 1976: 234-235; Castellino and Allen 2003: 69; Ireland 
1938: 327; Kunz 1953: 667-669; Marcus 1952: 189-192).   
 Other scholars agree that this congress and the treaty that resulted from it represented an 
important milestone in the development of uti possidetis.  Alvarez (1909: 290), for example, notes 
that the uti possidetis of 1810 "was, moreover, recognized in fact by all the states, and proclaimed in 
the Congress of Lima in 1848."  Similarly, Ireland (1938: 327) writes that the doctrine "came 
gradually to be accepted as a general guiding principle, in South America known as the doctrine of 
the Uti Possidetis of 1810, and proclaimed in the Congress of Lima un 1848."  Bächler (1976: 261) 
argues that at the start of independence from Spanish rule, border problems between the new states 
were practically nonexistent; it was only later, when national consolidation and the discovery of new 
resources necessitated the precise demarcation of border lines, that uti possidetis was applied in 
earnest.  Edwards (1925: 290) similarly suggests that the intraregional dimension of uti possidetis 
was recognized as important during the Congress of Lima: "Already frontier questions were 
beginning to appear and, in order to prevent the conflicts to which they might give rise, it was 
decided that, in the absence of special stipulations, the boundaries of the various States should be 
those existing at the time of their emancipation from the Spanish rule." 
 After the 1848 treaty, a number of other multilateral efforts attempted to formalize elements 
of uti possidetis.  The next effort began with the Continental Treaty or Tripartite Treaty that was 
signed in Santiago by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru on 15 September 1856, with the goal of producing a 
confederation of Latin American states (for the first time allowing the inclusion of Brazil).  Article 
13 contained a pledge not to cede national territory to any foreign power or to recognize any such 
cession, although it allowed the cession of territory between signatory states for the purpose of 
regulating or establishing their borders for mutual benefit; other articles included provisions for 
mediation of serious issues arising among member states.  The signatories attempted to broaden the 
pact to include other states, and a two-day conference of Latin American diplomats at the Peruvian 
                                                                                                                                                       
colonial borders qualifies (even if these references are not accompanied by the Latin phrase itself). 
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legation in Washington led to a "plan of alliance" signed by seven states on 9 November 1856.  
While a number of states eventually signed the treaty, though, it never came into effect, and was 
shelved by the three original signatories in September 1857 (Alvarez 1909: 283-285; Bächler 1975: 
294; Castellino and Allen 2003: 70-71; Marcus 1952: 193-194; Nuermberger1940: 43-54). 
 An 1864-1865 congress in Lima (including Peru, Chile, El Salvador, Venezuela, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia,) produced the Pact of Union and Defensive Alliance, which called for joint 
action to defend signatories' independence and territorial integrity against any foreign aggression, 
whether from other signatories or from extraregional powers.  Each state agreed to refuse to grant 
any protectorate or cede any territory, although the pact allowed the peaceful renegotiation of 
boundaries and exchanges of contiguous territory between the parties via mutual agreement.  This 
congress also produced the Pact of Preservation of Peace, which provided that only peaceful 
mechanisms could be used to settle differences (specifically including territorial problems) and 
required the use of other members' good offices or arbitration when the parties could not settle their 
problems bilaterally (Alvarez 1909: 285-287; Castellino and Allen 2003: 71-73; Frazer 1949: 339-
340; Inman 1965: 26-29; Kunz 1953: 670-672; Marcus 1952: 194-200). 
 As Alvarez (1990: 300 ff) describes it, the idea of Latin American confederation was largely 
abandoned later in the nineteenth century, "principally owing to the fact that the fear of European 
conquest no longer existed."  By this time, efforts turned from solidarity against external threats to 
the management of internal threats to order and stability.  As the century drew to a close, the Latin 
American states and the United States began efforts to integrate the hemisphere more closely, 
leading to the 1889-1890 Pan American Conference or Washington Conference (Alvarez 1909: 
326-329).  This conference produced a treaty calling for obligatory arbitration of differences as a 
general principle of inter-American relations, which was signed by most of the states at the 
conference but was never ratified by even one. The conference also produced a declaration rejecting 
conquest and declaring that the cession of territory under threat of force would be invalid, although 
this was not included in the final arbitration treaty that was signed at the end of the conference. 
 
Norm Internalization 
 The internalization stage of the uti possidetis norm – when the norm becomes widely 
accepted and is no longer a matter of broad public debate -- is a bit more difficult to date than the 
earlier stages.  The various international congresses that had been held during the nineteenth 
century always failed to produce a signed and ratified document embodying the principles of uti 
possidetis and intraregional respect for territorial integrity.  Yet agreement on these principles 
appears to have increased during this time, culminating in the Swiss Federal Council’s 1922 arbitral 
award in the Colombia-Venezuela territorial claim.  As noted earlier, this award described uti 
possidetis as a standard principle of Latin American international law, indicating that an outside 
 13 
 
party with little direct involvement in the region believed that this doctrine was widely accepted in 
the region.9  We consider this to be the first evidence that uti possidetis had reached the norm 
internalization stage, although this may have happened earlier.10   
 Over the next few decades after the Swiss award indicated that the states in the region 
generally accepted uti possidetis, multilateral treaties incorporating the principles associated with 
this norm finally began to come into effect.  For example, states in the region signed the Anti-War 
Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (or Saavedra Lamas Pact) in reaction to the ongoing 
Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1933.  Article 2 of this pact declared that “territorial 
questions [between the High Contracting Parties] must not be settled by violence, and that they will 
not recognize any territorial arrangement which is not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of 
the occupation or acquisition of territories that may be brought about by force of arms."  This was 
followed the next year by the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, which 
included the following obligations in Article 11: "The contracting states definitely establish as the 
rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special 
advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in 
threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a 
state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force 
imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily."  Each 
former Spanish colony in Central and South America signed one or both pacts, except for Bolivia 
(which was then involved in the Chaco War); Paraguay waited until after the war was ended and the 
Chaco issue with Bolivia was settled before signing. 
 There also seems to have been a point where the norm was clearly internalized in nearly 
every state in the region.  Zacher (2001) sees the year 1975 as a watershed year when the general 
territorial integrity norm was significantly strengthened by the signing of new documents such as 
the Helsinki Final Act, and he finds no more cases of successful territorial aggrandizement after this 
time.  For Latin America, 1948 appears to have been a similar watershed,  Before this time, the 
treaties that had been signed included relatively few states, primarily in South America.  During 
these years, though, the charter of the Organization of American States was signed on 30 April 
1948 (it entered into force in December 1951 following enough ratifications), including the 
following provisions in Article 21: "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, 
                                                
9 Bächler (1975: 217-233) also notes that references to colonial borders were common in arbitral 
awards concerning Latin American borders, although the term uti possidetis was not explicitly 
mentioned in many of these awards. 
10 Many of the Latin American states also signed and ratified the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, which (as noted above) contained an explicit guarantee of territorial integrity against 
external aggression, although this was not a specific effort by the Latin American states to enshrine 
their regional principles in writing. 
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even temporarily, or military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, 
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.  No territorial acquisitions or special advantages 
obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.”  Around this same 
time, most of the Latin American states also signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance in September 1947 (entered into force in December 1948) and Treaty on Pacific 
Settlement or Pact of Bogotá in April 1948 (entered into force in May 1949), which reinforced the 
obligations to renounce the use of force and settle conflicts peacefully -- although without a specific 
territorial obligation.  After this time, all of the former Spanish colonies in Latin America were 
bound by explicit obligations to respect all borders and to reject any coercive or forceful acquisition 
of territory in the region. 
 
Impact of Uti Possidetis 
 With the timing of the norm described in as much detail as possible, we must now consider 
its specific content, in order to determine how effective this norm has been.  With respect to the two 
types of territorial integrity obligations discussed earlier, the Latin American uti possidetis norm 
constituted a proscription against the violent acquisition of territory, rather than a general obligation 
to respect all states’ territorial integrity and reject peaceful change.  Alvarez (1909: 344) notes that 
there was some effort "to proclaim as a principle of 'American' International Law the territorial 
integrity of the states of the New World exactly as they were when they freed themselves from 
Spanish dominion -- nullifying, in consequence, territorial accessions and annexations.  But this has 
been no more than a noble ideal, and has not been given any practical application in the diplomatic 
history of America."  Most discussions and applications of uti possidetis left open the possibility of 
peaceful territorial change by mutual agreement, only opposing the threat or use of force for the 
acquisition of territory.11   
 The Latin American application of uti possidetis was also limited in effect to the territories 
of former Spanish colonies, with no impact on borders with (contemporary or former) colonies of 
other foreign powers.  Castellino and Allen (2003: 65) note, for example, that the Creole leaders of 
the former Spanish colonies "did not feel the need to include other groups within the continent in 
the process."  While some have suggested that Brazil -- which achieved independence around the 
same time as the Spanish colonies in South America -- was also covered by uti possidetis, Brazil 
generally rejected the application of uti possidetis de jure (legal possession) in favor of uti 
possidetis de facto (effective possession), an alternative doctrine that determines ownership of 
                                                
11 Kacowicz (2005: 77) notes a clear linkage in the Latin American application of the norms of uti 
possidetis, territorial integrity, respect for sovereignty, and the principle of avoiding the use of force; 
he cites several Latin American treaties that incorporate elements of each. 
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territory based on physical occupation rather than colonial title.12  Brazil used this alternative 
doctrine to argue for the expansion of its territory well beyond the supposed 1810 legal borders 
with former Spanish colonies; not surprisingly, the former Spanish colonies generally opposed this, 
fearing the loss of territory to both Brazilian and European expansion (Ireland 1938: 327; Bächler 
1976: 251-258; Ganzert 1934: 430 ff; Tambs 1966: 255 ff; Shaw 1996: 100; Lalonde 2002: 31-32; 
Parodi 2002: 6-8). 
 Many scholars have argued that this doctrine of uti possidetis generally reduced territorial 
conflict in the Americas.  Castellino and Allen (2003: 74-75) argue that despite the failure of 
multilateral efforts to codify the uti possidetis principle, "there is little doubt that the doctrine of uti 
possidetis remained central to the conduct of governance and territorial demarcations in Latin 
America."  Zacher (2001: 229) argues that uti possidetis “had some impact in promoting greater 
order” in Latin America, although it was not always respected by every country in the region.  
Kacowicz (2005: 60) suggests that “The norm of uti possidetis has fulfilled a crucial role in thye 
peaceful settlement and management of territorial disputes and conflicts” in Latin America.  He 
elaborates that “Without ruling out competing explanations of Realpolitik and self-interest, it is 
clear that the norms of peaceful settlement, convivencia, concertación, and uti possidetis help to 
explain the maintenance of regional peace since 1883,” and that such norms and institutions “have 
kept the rigidity of the international borders” in the region and “have maintained international 
disputes without escalating to war.”  Domínguez et al. (2003: 21) also argue that “Given immense 
geographic spaces, seemingly insurmountable barriers such as the Andean mountains or the 
extensive dense tropical forests that filled much of Central and South America, state leaders with 
limited resources found it cost-effective to honor and rely on uti possidetis to address most border 
issues,” and conclude that “Uti possidetis juris held successfully over time, with six exceptions, 
the last of which occurred in 1941.”  Ireland's (1938, 1941) territorial history of the Western 
Hemisphere is full of examples where two Latin American states agreed to make uti possidetis a 
key consideration in foreign arbitration over their border, and where borders that were eventually 
determined by independent states were very close to the previous Spanish colonial borders. 
 Despite the good intentions behind the application of uti possidetis in Latin America, many 
scholars note that the doctrine’s application in this region was plagued by a number of problems 
(e.g., Brownlie 1998: 132-133; Prescott 1987: 105-106, 199 ff; Ratner 1996: 594, 607-608; 
Kacowicz 2005: 76-77).  One issue was that the Spanish had employed a wide variety of 
                                                
12 Castellino and Allen (2003: 65) note that both Brazil and the former Spanish colonies in South 
America agreed that the lines at independence should be sacrosanct.  The main difference, though, 
was that Brazil (which had expanded its de facto control well beyond the de jure borders established 
in various Spanish-Portuguese treaties) emphasized the de facto lines well its neighbors emphasized 
the de jure lines.    
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administrative units, with different borders often delimiting military, political, and religious entities; 
several different newly independent states could thus claim possession of the same territory based 
on inheritance from different Spanish entities.  The Spanish often changed the borders of their 
administrative units over time through seemingly arbitrary royal decrees or cédulas from Madrid, 
raising questions about which state’s colonial predecessor actually possessed a given territory 
under Spanish rule.  For example, a Spanish royal order in 1803 transferred the islands of San 
Andrés and part of the Mosquito Coast from the Captaincy-General of Guatemala (today’s Central 
America) to the Viceroyalty of Santa Fé (today’s Colombia); both Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
claimed after independence that this transfer had only referred to military jurisdiction and had not 
changed political sovereignty (Ireland 1941: 164-165).  Other borders were never clearly marked 
due to ignorance of local geography, as the entire continent was never completely explored or 
settled under Spanish rule. For example, the Bolivia-Chile and Bolivia-Paraguay borders were 
defined only vaguely and incompletely in Spanish documents and maps, allowing each side in these 
respective territorial claims to argue that its colonial predecessors had explored and administered 
territory beyond the presumptive border lines that were inherited at independence (Fifer 1972).  As 
Boggs (1940: 80) notes, inconsistencies and ambiguities had not posed problems under a single 
colonial sovereign but were much more troublesome for relations between independent states. 
 Hill (1945: 155) suggests that these problems actually caused numerous problems with 
respect to Latin America n borders, rather than solving them: "It was expected that the doctrine of 
uti possidetis would do away with boundary disputes between the new states of Latin America, but 
such was not the case.  No one can tell whether there have been fewer disputes, but it is certain that 
the doctrine itself has been the cause of many."  Prescott (1987: 105) similarly argues the uti 
possidetis principle "in fact caused some conflict because of confusion over its interpretation." 
Lalonde (2002: 230-231) summarizes her study of nineteenth century Latin America on a similarly 
negative note:  "we were unable to conclude that the uti possidetis principle had played either a 
significant or a successful role in settling boundary issues between the new republics...  a number 
of obstacles prevented the uti possidetis principle from having much of an impact in Latin America: 
different interpretations of the principle, inconsistent state practice, and a lack of precise information 
regarding the location of the former Spanish administrative lines." 
 These widely varying views on the impact of uti possidetis indicate that systematic empirical 
analysis is needed.  This doctrine appears to have been an important precursor to the global 
territorial integrity norm, which was used to promote territorial stability both between Latin 
American states and to prevent outside actors from making new claims.  While some scholars 
conclude that it successfully reduced militarized conflict over territory between the former Spanish 
colonies, others argue that the difficulties in its application may have increased or worsened such 
challenges.   We examine the impact of uti possidetis with the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 3:  Militarized challenges to territory should be less likely, ceteris paribus, when there 
is a stronger uti possidetis norm.   
Hypothesis 3a:  Territorial claims between former Spanish colonies in Latin America should be 
less likely to lead to militarized conflict than comparable claims elsewhere in the world. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Territorial claims between former Spanish colonies in Latin America should be 
less likely to lead to militarized conflict when there is a stronger regional recognition of the uti 
possidetis doctrine with respect to intraregional borders. 
 
 It should be noted that we are focusing here on the intraregional rather than extraregional 
dimension of uti possidetis.  There are several issues that would complicate a systematic analysis of 
the extraregional dimension.  First, even if the doctrine were to be accepted as an international norm 
by the Latin American states (the main focus of this paper's analysis), the success of this norm at 
preventing foreign intervention or expansion would require that the foreign states accept the norm, 
and we are not aware of systematic scholarship claiming that the major European powers accepted 
the legal arguments behind this norm.  Second, if such an analysis were attempted, it would be 
nearly impossible to disentangle the effects of the Latin American states' emphasis on uti possidetis 
from the effects of the United States' Monroe Doctrine, which began around the same time and 
similarly sought to oppose any extraregional intervention in the Western Hemisphere (these 
similarities are discussed extensively by Alvarez 1909).  Few extraregional claims began after the 
region achieved independence, with the notable exceptions of the 1860s Spanish claim to the 
Chincha Islands and numerous U.S. efforts to expand and acquire territory throughout the region.  
While this relative lack of extraregional involvement is certainly consistent with this norm, though, 
we are unwilling to attribute this to the functioning of an effective Latin American norm that spread 
to affect the behavior of major European powers. 
 
Research Design 
 These hypotheses will be tested using two approaches.  First, we will undertake an analysis 
of global patterns of territorial conflict since 1816.  This approach, similar to Zacher’s (2001) 
preliminary evaluation of the territorial integrity norm, will allow us to determine how much impact 
both violent and general territorial integrity obligations appear to have had on armed conflict over 
territory.  We will supplement this with a more detailed analysis of territorial claim management 
using data on specific territorial claims, which will allow us to examine the impact of uti possidetis 
and territorial integrity norms while controlling for other factors such as the salience of the territory 
that is at stake in each situation.   
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Global Analysis of Territorial Integrity Norms 
 Our global analyses involve an analysis of territorial conflict over the modern era, covering 
global history since 1816 (the time span covered by the necessary data sets).  The purpose of these 
analyses is to determine whether the increasing strength of the territorial integrity norm(s) over time 
has been associated with a reduction in territorial conflict.  This approach is similar to that used by 
Zacher (2001: 223-224), who examined various historical periods to compare the number of 
territorial conflicts that occurred and the proportion of these conflicts that led to the redistribution of 
territory.  Zacher found that this proportion had declined substantially over time, and that the 
number of redistributions per year had dropped dramatically from the first half to the second half of 
the twentieth century.  Zacher concluded that the territorial integrity norm had made an important 
difference in territorial conflict behavior. 
 We seek to improve on Zacher's analyses in several ways.  First, we offer multiple measures 
of the changing strength of territorial integrity norms over time, which we believe will allow a more 
accurate measure of the norms' impact.  We also examine this impact using multiple measures of 
territorial conflict, ranging from low-level armed conflict over territory to the violent transfer of 
territory between nation-states.  Finally, whereas Zacher (2001: 224) explicitly noted that he was 
making no claim about the statistical significance of his results, we seek to use statistical techniques 
to get the most accurate picture of the actual impact of these norms.13   
 
Measuring Territorial Integrity Norms 
Zacher measured the strength of the global territorial integrity norm by reference to 
international treaties and documents that seemed to embody this norm, which he used to delimit 
which historical eras corresponded to Finnemore and Sikkink's stages of norm development.  We 
believe that a more accurate measurement can be made with reference to the actual treaties 
themselves.  That is, rather than using the signing of major treaties or documents to indicate which 
years seem to fit various stages of norm development, we measure the average number of territorial 
integrity obligations that each state has accepted in a given year.  This approach gives a much more 
detailed indication of the strength of the norm at any point in time, and captures variation in the 
norm's strength within each of the various stages of norm development. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 We have already described the differences between violent and general territorial integrity 
obligations, and presented a list of multilateral treaties encapsulating each type of obligation in 
Appendix I.  Table 1 presents the average number of territorial integrity obligations for each state in 
                                                
13 As discussed earlier, Zacher (2001: 224) also noted that the criteria for inclusion of wars were 
different for the years before and after 1945, which is the time when he found the greatest apparent 
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the international system, both overall and for each historical era in the territorial integrity norm as 
described by Zacher.  There were no qualifying territorial integrity treaties of either type before 
1919.  During what Zacher describes as the norm's emergence stage (1919-1945), each state has an 
average of 1.0 violent territorial integrity obligations per year, reflecting membership in the League 
of Nations as well as signature of several South American treaties; there is also an average of 0.03 
general territorial integrity obligations, reflecting the few states in the Locarno Pact.  In the norm 
cascade stage (1946-1975), these figures rise to 1.46 violent obligations and 0.37 general 
obligations, and the total commitments rises from 1.03 to 1.83 per year.  Finally, in the norm 
internalization stage (1976-2001), violent obligations increase slightly to 1.49 and general 
obligations increase substantially to 1.52, for a total of 3.0 territorial integrity obligations per year.  
These obligations are thus consistent with Zacher's characterization of the various phases of the 
norm, with the added benefit of capturing variation in the strength of the norm within each phase in 
the norm's development as new states join existing treaties or new treaties are signed. 
 We use these treaty obligations to measure the strength of the territorial integrity norm.  
Our analyses begin by comparing Zacher's historical periods (1816-1918, 1919-1945, 1946-1975, 
and 1976-2001), for the fairest comparison with his preliminary analyses.  We then supplement this 
with analyses using the average number of territorial integrity obligations of each type -- violent, 
general, and total -- in the interstate system in a given year.  When the average state in the system 
has more such obligations, then we believe that the territorial integrity norm is stronger, in the sense 
that more states in the system have accepted territorial integrity provisions in the treaties that they 
have signed.  We believe that this will give a more accurate measure of the strength of this norm 
than in possible with a simple distinction between different historical periods where the norm was 
said to be stronger, particularly by allowing variation of the strength of the norm within each 
historical stage in the development of the norm,. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 In testing the impact of the uti possidetis and territorial integrity norms, it is important to 
specify exactly which types of behavior would be considered to violate the norms.  Zacher focused 
on successful territorial aggrandizement by force, which he measured by major territorial 
aggressions that led to the redistribution of territory.  We focus on multiple forms of conflict over 
territory, recognizing that different treaties specify different behaviors that are proscribed.   
 First, we are interested in the outbreak of armed conflict over territory.  Unlike Zacher, we 
consider the threat or use of military force to be in opposition to the territorial integrity norm, 
because it represents the type of behavior that the norm seeks to prevent; we believe that a 
                                                                                                                                                       
impact of the norm. 
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successful norm will prevent attempts to conquer or otherwise acquire territory by force, as well as 
preventing the success of such attempts when they are made.  We measure this using version 3.02 
of the Correlates of War (COW) militarized interstate dispute data set (Ghosn et al. 2004), using 
the status quo revision variables to determine whether at least one of the participants in a given 
dispute was attempting to modify the territorial status quo; we exclude all disputes where no 
disputant was attempting to do so.  One potential objection to using this data set is that many 
militarized disputes only include isolated threats or border buildups that never escalate to more 
dangerous levels, and would thus not qualify as what Zacher (2001) called "territorial wars" or 
"major military conflicts."  We thus supplement the overall analyses by using the subset of 
militarized disputes that produced more than one hundred battlefield fatalities. 
 As with Zacher, though, we recognize that the success of efforts to acquire territory is also 
important.  We thus include additional analyses examining the transfer of territory, as measured by 
the COW territorial change data set (Goertz and Diehl 1992).  We limit the analysis to those cases 
where territory is exchanged between two members of the interstate system, because the data set 
includes many cases where a state acquires territory from a non-state actor or loses territory to such 
an actor; we are only concerned with interaction between states  We also distinguish between 
territorial changes that occur through peaceful means and those that occur through organized 
violence; both violent and general territorial integrity obligations seek to prevent the violent transfer 
of territory, but violent obligations appear to allow the peaceful transfer of territory, making this an 
important distinction for analysis.   
 
Analysis of Uti Possidetis in Latin America 
 The global analyses discussed so far have several important limitations.  First, they are 
unable to determine whether the states that have accepted territorial integrity obligations at any given 
point in time are the ones that engage in any observed territorial conflict at that time.  Second, they 
are unable to determine how many states are engaged in territorial claims at any given point in time, 
and thus how many states might be willing to consider threatening or using force over territory.  
Finally, to the extent that territorial claims do exist at any point in time, they are unable to determine 
the salience or value of the claimed territory, which seems likely to be an important influence on 
states' decisions about whether or not to use force.  We supplement the global analyses with a more 
detailed analysis of territorial claims that can help to overcome these limitations, and that is 
particularly useful for studying the uti possidetis norm in Latin America. 
 These analyses use data on territorial claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) 
project, which includes all cases where official government representatives of at least two nation-
states make explicit, competing claims to sovereignty over specific territories (Hensel 2001).  
Unfortunately, this data set is currently only complete for claims to territory in the Western 
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Hemisphere (North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean) and Western Europe from 
1816-2001; the best alternative data set, Huth and Allee's territorial disputes data, covers the whole 
world but only goes back to 1919 and is thus of little help in assessing how the post-World War I 
era (when the territorial integrity norm is said to have developed) differs from earlier times.  The 
ICOW data is actually quite reasonable for this project, though, because it is already complete for 
the two regions where most states have been independent for most of the past two centuries.  
Additional regions such as Africa or the Middle East would not offer as useful a comparison to the 
interactions of the Latin American states in the nineteenth century, because most states in those 
regions were not independent in the era before the uti possidetis and territorial integrity norms 
began to develop. 
 
Measuring the Uti Possidetis Norm 
 Unfortunately for measuring the uti possidetis norm in Latin America, there is no easy way 
to measure the changing strength of this norm over time.  As discussed above, there are no 
multilateral treaties or documents that specifically embody this norm in the nineteenth century when 
the norm was said to be developing and strengthening; the various attempts to produce such treaties 
failed to attract either enough signatures or enough ratifications to take legal effect.  The best that 
we can do is to distinguish between the years when we believe the norm was in each stage of 
development, as discussed earlier: the emergence phase, beginning with the 1848 congress; the 
cascade phase, beginning with the 1922 Swiss arbitral award; and the internalization phase, 
beginning with the entry into force of the OAS charter in 1951. 
 Another important way to evaluate this norm is to distinguish between states whose relations 
were said to be governed by the norm, and states that should have been unaffected.  As discussed 
above, it seems clear that the intraregional provisions of uti possidetis were only intended to apply 
to relations between the former Spanish colonies of Central and South America.  Each multilateral 
conference that attempted to encapsulate the norm in treaty form involved former Spanish colonies; 
Brazil generally rejected uti possidetis de jure in favor of the alternative uti possidetis de facto; and 
there appears to have been little effort to spread the norm to Central or South American colonies of 
other powers (notably Belize, Guyana, and Suriname).   
 
Dependent Variables 
 Our analysis of territorial claims examines the militarization of claims, or the outbreak of 
militarized interstate disputes over territory.  As with the global analyses, we run separate analyses 
examining the outbreak of any militarized dispute and the outbreak of disputes that produce more 
than one hundred battlefield fatalities.  We add a new wrinkle here, though, in order to make sure 
that the militarized dispute is only counted for the territorial claim(s) that it sought to resolve; two 
 22 
 
states may be involved in numerous territorial claims at the same time.  Identification of militarized 
disputes begins with version 3.02 of the militarized dispute data set, as discussed earlier, but 
involves additional work to determine for each dispute whether it involved attempts to change the 
status quo with respect to a specific territorial claim in the ICOW data set.14  
 
Control Variables 
 In order to avoid exaggerating the impact of the international norm, these analyses will 
control for the impact of other factors that might make armed conflict more or less likely. We begin 
with the salience of the claimed territory, or its value to the participants.  Earlier research (e.g., Huth 
1996; Hensel 2001; Huth and Allee 2002) suggests that claims involving more salient territories are 
more difficult to resolve and more likely to lead to militarized conflict.  We use the ICOW salience 
index (Hensel et al. 2006), which measures the presence or absence of six different indicators for 
each of the two claimants, each of which is thought to make the territory more valuable: a strategic 
location, valuable economic resources, ethnic or other identity ties to the territory, a permanent 
population rather than uninhabited territory, historical ties to the territory (as measured by 
exercising sovereignty over it within the previous two centuries), and homeland rather than colonial 
territory.  Because each indicator may be present or absent for each of the two claimants, the 
salience measure ranges from zero to twelve in any given year. 
 We also control for the adversaries' recent conflict behavior over the same territorial claim, 
with the expectation that the accumulation of more recent conflict will make subsequent conflict 
more likely. We measure each of these variables using a weighted score to indicate both the number 
of events and how recently they occurred.  Events in the most recent year before the observation 
contribute a value of 1.0 to the weighted score.  Earlier events' weights decline by ten percent each 
year, so an event five years earlier contributes a value of 0.5 and an event ten years earlier 
contributes only 0.1 to the weighted score; the weighted values for all events in the past decade are 
added together (see also Hensel et al. 2006). 
 Finally, we control for joint democracy and the adversaries' and relative capabilities.  A 
variety of research suggests that armed conflict is less likely between two political democracies; 
joint democracy is measured with the Polity 4 data set, and indicates whether or not both claimants 
were coded with values of six or greater on the Polity index of institutionalized democracy.  If one 
state is substantially stronger than its opponent, then we might expect militarized conflict to be 
                                                
14 The official MID data set is available at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu/>; the modified version used in 
this paper is available as part of the ICOW data downloads at <http://data.icow.org>.  This measure 
codes some cases differently from the MID data itself, as we require that a given MID explicitly 
involve an attempt to revise the territorial status quo with respect to a specific ICOW territorial 
claim.  Some cases that COW coded as involving territorial issues do not fit with a qualifying 
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much less likely than would be the case between two relatively even adversaries, drawing from a 
variety of research indicating that relative parity is much more conflictual than preponderance by 
one side.  Relative capabilities are measured using the Composite Index of National Capabilities 
(CINC) score from version 3.01 of the COW National Material Capabilities data set (Singer 1988), 
taking the challenger’s CINC score as a percentage of the dyadic total.  
 
Empirical Analyses 
 [Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Global Analysis of Territorial Integrity Norms 
 Our first analyses address the global impact of territorial integrity norms.  Table 2 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis.  There is wide variation in both the 
dependent variables measuring territorial conflict and the independent variables measuring territorial 
integrity norms.  For example, the number of militarized disputes over territorial issues ranges from 
zero to sixteen per year, and the number with more than 100 fatalities ranges from zero to four.  The 
number of territorial changes also ranges from zero to 23, from zero to thirteen of which occurred 
through violent processes. 
 Table 3 presents the results of a number of OLS regression analyses. using a variety of 
measures of territorial integrity norms to predict a variety of measures of armed conflict over 
territory.  Each model controls for the number of states in the interstate system, which seems likely 
to increase the amount of conflict as the system has grown.  Not surprisingly, this control variable 
has a positive effect (increasing conflict) in almost every model, and it is statistically significant in 
about half. 
 The first measure of these norms uses dummy variables to capture Zacher's stages of the 
development of the territorial integrity norm, and produces somewhat surprising results.  As the 
territorial norm is first developing and strengthening (1919-1945 and 1946-1975), militarized 
conflict over territory is significantly more likely than in earlier years before the norm first 
appeared, and there is no significant impact of the most recent phase when the norm was strongest 
(1976-2001).  None of these stages in the norm's development has had a significant impact on any 
other measure of territorial conflict, though, whether severe militarized disputes over territory or 
either violent or peaceful territorial changes. 
 Measuring the strength of the norm with these simple temporal eras thus suggests that the 
norm has had little of the intended effect of reducing territorial conflict, even in the most recent era 
when it was supposedly strongest, and that the early development of the norm may even be 
associated with increased conflict (although not the most severe forms of conflict),.  The rest of this 
                                                                                                                                                       
ICOW claim, and some that COW did not code as territorial do indeed involve an ICOW claim. 
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table investigates whether stronger results are obtained by measuring the average number of 
territorial integrity obligations that each state has accepted.  Separate analyses are run for violent 
and general territorial integrity obligations, as discussed earlier, as well as for all obligations of 
either type. 
 Violent territorial integrity obligations have a mixed effect, significantly increasing the 
number of militarized disputes over territory (which is consistent with the results using temporal 
eras described above) as well as the number of territorial changes per year, while not having any 
systematic impact on severe militarized disputes or violent territorial changes.  General territorial 
integrity obligations have a much stronger and more consistent effect, though, significantly 
decreasing all four dependent variables.  When both violent and general obligations are combined 
into a single measure of territorial integrity obligations, there is no significant impact, which is 
probably not surprising given the different effects of the two types of obligation. 
 Together, these results suggest that the territorial integrity norm has had relatively little 
impact on territorial conflict, at least until the norm began to be phrased in more general terms rather 
than specifically proscribing only the violent acquisition of territory.  Hypothesis 1, which 
suggested that militarized challenges should be less likely when the norm is stronger, received 
mixed support; violent territorial integrity obligations are associated with more challenges overall 
but not more severe challenges, general territorial integrity obligations are associated with less 
challenges of each type, and combining these two categories of obligations has no systematic effect.  
Hypothesis 2, which suggested that violent territorial changes should be less likely when the norm 
is stronger, also received mixed support; violent and total obligations have no systematic impact, 
while general territorial integrity obligations as associated with less violent changes.  Finally, there 
is mixed support for Hypothesis 2a, which suggested that even peaceful territorial changes should 
be less likely under general territorial integrity obligations but that violent obligations should have 
little impact; general obligations are indeed associated with significantly less peaceful changes, but 
violent obligations are actually associated with more peaceful changes. 
 This is not to say, of course, that the development of a territorial integrity norm has ever 
caused territorial conflict.  The apparent effect where several stages in the norm's development saw 
increased numbers of territorial militarized disputes, or where a greater prevalence of violent 
territorial integrity obligations is associated with more such disputes, may reflect the difficult 
international context that led to the signing of the treaties embodying the norm.  For example, two 
of the earliest treaties embodying violent territorial integrity obligations -- the Saavedra Lamas Pact 
and the Montevideo Convention -- came about while South America was experiencing several major 
armed conflicts over territory (the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay and the Leticia dispute 
between Colombia and Peru) and numerous other territorial claims.  The occurrence of further 
conflict in the region -- and the significant, positive coefficients in Table 3 -- should be taken more 
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as evidence that these treaties were unable to control the already-existing problems that led to their 
creation, rather than that the treaties caused the problems to escalate. 
 These analyses also have some important limitations, as noted earlier.  We have improved 
on Zacher's preliminary analyses by distinguishing between two different forms taken by the norm, 
examining four different indicators of territorial conflict, and controlling for the number of states in 
the system.  Yet these analyses only examine the average number of territorial integrity obligations 
for each state in the system, and can not tell us whether the states with the states with the most 
obligations are more or less likely to be involved in the observed conflict.15  They also can not tell us 
how many states are involved in territorial claims that might be managed through military conflict.  
It would be difficult to credit an international norm for the avoidance of territorial conflict when 
there were few or no situations where states disagreed over territory and could thus have considered 
starting territorial conflict.16  The remaining analyses attempt to address such concerns. 
 
Analysis of Uti Possidetis in Latin America 
 Table 4 examines the impact of the uti possidetis norm -- measured three different ways -- 
on the outbreak of militarized conflict over territorial claims between former Spanish colonies in 
Central or South America.  This is the area where this norm was intended to apply, as described 
above, so these cases offer the most appropriate way to test the impact of the norm as it changed in 
strength over time.  Table 5 then compares these cases to all other territorial claims in the Western 
Hemisphere and Western Europe over the same time period, in order to determine whether these 
Latin American cases as a whole differed from other cases because of the norm, 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 The top half of each table uses logit analysis to investigate the outbreak of any militarized 
dispute over a particular territorial claim, while the bottom half is limited to those disputes that 
produced more than 100 fatalities.  In no case -- whether in Latin America or in the larger set of 
cases, and whether examining all conflict or only the most severe cases -- is there a systematic 
difference in the likelihood of conflict based on the era.  Dummy variables indicating the periods 
that we consider to represent the emergence, cascade, and internalization stages of the norm are all 
                                                
15 To Zacher, this is not a source of concern.  At several points in his paper, he suggests that the 
occurrence of territorial conflict does not necessarily weaken the norm, as long as other states that 
accept the norm take action to ensure that the challenge is not successful.  For example, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait is considered to demonstrate the success of the norm, because other states 
responded to ensure that Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. 
16 This suggests another possible contextual effect, related to the interpretation of the apparent 
positive association between violent obligations and conflict.  If treaties or institutions reflecting 
general territorial integrity obligations are only likely to be created once most existing problems 
have been resolved, the apparent negative association between general obligations and conflict may 
reflect the international environment's lack of possible challenges over territory. 
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insignificant.  The number of territorial integrity obligations -- violent, general, or total -- shared by 
the adversaries is associated with more militarized disputes overall, although there is no systematic 
impact on the most severe disputes. 
 The results in Table 5 indicate that territorial claims between former Spanish colonies were 
more likely to experience armed conflict overall than are other claims in these regions, at least in 
Model I (p < .03); the result is slightly less significant in Models II and III (p < .14 in both cases).17  
These same claims are less likely to experience serious armed conflict, though, with significant 
negative effects on conflicts of more than 100 fatalities (p < .02 or better in each model).  For those 
cases where uti possidetis was intended to apply, then, its effects were mixed -- more armed conflict 
was experienced overall, but the resulting conflicts were much less likely to escalate to serious 
levels. 
 Most of the other variables in these models have significant effects as well.  Consistent with 
past research, the salience of the claimed territory and the accumulation of recent militarized 
disputes both increase the probability of armed conflict in most models of Tables 4 and 5, whether 
measured by any militarized disputes or by those of more than 100 fatalities (for which salience did 
not have a systematic impact in Table 4).  A greater imbalance in relative capabilities also makes 
conflict significantly less likely, both for any militarized disputes (where it was not significant in 
Table 4) and for those of more than 100 fatalities.  Joint democracy has little systemtic impact. 
 These results offer mixed support for the hypotheses.  Hypothesis 3a suggested that 
territorial claims between former Spanish colonies in Latin America should be less likely to lead to 
militarized conflict than comparable claims elsewhere in the world.  This does not seem to be 
supported when considering all militarized disputes, which includes threats to use force and border 
buildups as well as more violent confrontations, but it does appear to be true for more severe 
confrontations.  Hypothesis 3b also suggested that within these cases, militarized conflict should be 
less likely when there is stronger regional recognition of the intraregional uti possidetis doctrine.  
There seems to be little support for this, whether the strength of the norm is measured by temporal 
periods for stages of norm development or by shared territorial integrity obligations. 
 
Discussion 
 Taken together, this study’s analyses suggest a clear picture of the impact of the territorial 
integrity norm and its uti possidetis predecessor.  First, there have been two distinct territorial 
integrity norms in recent history, one that proscribes the acquisition of territory by the threat or use 
of force and one that seeks to preserve territorial integrity more generally.  Both norms are 
                                                
17 If general territorial integrity obligations are used instead of violent or total, the variable indicating 
claims between former Spanish colonies is statistically significant (p < .04). 
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becoming increasingly widespread, but their effects on territorial conflict appear to be mixed.  They 
were also preceded by the uti possidetis norm in Latin America, which corresponded closely to the 
more recent violent territorial integrity norm, and which had similarly mixed results. 
 The Latin American states where the uti possidetis doctrine was applied may have been 
somewhat more likely than comparable states in other regions to engage in armed conflict over their 
territorial claims, but they were significantly less likely to engage in the most severe forms of 
conflict.  None of the alternative measures of the strength of this norm had a stabilizing impact 
among these states, though, with greater numbers of territorial integrity obligations being associated 
with more armed conflict overall and having no systematic impact on more severe conflicts.  
Outside of Latin America, violent territorial integrity obligations -- which have been far more 
common than general obligations, at least until the last few decades of the twentieth century -- have 
had little systematic impact, although general territorial integrity obligations have been associated 
with a significant decrease in numerous measures of territorial conflict. 
 One important contribution of this study is the systematic evaluation of an important legal 
doctrine and international norm.  This study’s analyses reveal that neither uti possidetis nor the 
more global territorial integrity norms that followed it have been nearly as effective at avoiding 
challenges to the territorial status quo or reducing armed conflict as some have argued.  Beyond 
evaluating this specific legal doctrine, the study has helped increase our understanding of the 
management of territorial claims.  Our analyses indicate that neither the global territorial integrity 
norm described by Zacher (in either its general or violent manifestations) nor the earlier Latin 
American uti possidetis norm has been very successful in reducing armed conflict over territory. 
 This is not the final word on the impact of these norms, though.  More work could be done 
to measure the norms more accurately than has been possible here.  For example, the uti possidetis 
norm has been measured here with reference to the negotiation, signing, and ratification of 
multilateral treaties, but until the 1930s none of these treaties went into effect.  This means that for 
over a century of relations among independent Latin American states, we are unable to measure the 
evolving strength of this norm.  More creative measurement certainly seems possible, though, 
perhaps drawing from the example of Goertz and Diehl (1992).  Goertz and Diehl measured the 
strength of the decolonization norm by the cumulative number of former colonies that had become 
independent by a given point in time, as well as by the proportion of these independences that 
occurred peacefully rather than through violence.  Similar options for territorial integrity and uti 
possidetis might involve the cumulative number of constitutions, treaties, arbitral awards, or other 
observable phenomena that reflect the norm by referencing colonial borders; the proportion of 
states in the region that have adopted such constitutions or accepted such treaties; or the cumulative 
proportion of borders in the region that have been settled consistently with the norm, either 
reflecting the colonial border or being changed peacefully through mutual agreement.  We are not 
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convinced that these alternative measures will produce results that are more consistent with the 
stabilizing goal of these norms, because a substantial amount of armed conflict has occurred when 
each of these measures seems likely to indicate a relatively strong norm, but adopting such 
measures will leave us with greater insight into the robustness of the present paper’s results. 
 Future research should also investigate other aspects of uti possidetis besides militarized 
conflict.  While the doctrine is primarily thought of as a way to prevent territorial problems from 
arising or from leading to armed conflict, most discussions of the doctrine also include an emphasis 
on the peaceful settlement of territorial questions.  While the territorial integrity and uti possidetis 
norms as measured here have had little systematic impact on the avoidance of armed conflict, 
besides perhaps preventing conflicts that did occur from escalating to the most severe levels, these 
norms may have had a more positive impact on peaceful conflict settlement.  Future research would 
do well to investigate the extent to which third parties became involved in efforts to manage or settle 
territorial questions as the norms strengthened, and perhaps to use survival analysis to examine the 
impact of these norms on the termination of territorial claims. 
 Finally, it would be desirable for future work to examine the impact of the uti possidetis and 
territorial integrity norms in additional regions.  Although the legal principle of uti possidetis is 
typically associated with the Latin American experience, it has also been applied elsewhere, and in 
1986 it was described by the International Court of Justice as a general principle with application 
across time and space.18  This principle has been mentioned by governments and tribunals with 
respect to former colonial borders in Africa and Asia, as well as borders resulting from the 1990s 
breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, and even the potential secession of 
Quebec from Canada (e.g., Ratner 1996; Shaw 1996; Castellino 2000; Lalonde 2002; Castellino 
and Allen 2003).19   Most notably, the principle is enshrined in the OAU’s 1963 charter and 1964 
Cairo Declaration, in which the African leaders pledged “to respect the frontiers existing on their 
achievement of independence.”   
 Once the ICOW project completes data collection for Africa, future work should compare 
the post-independence management of African borders with the Latin American experience studied 
here.  A great deal of time passed between decolonization in Latin America and in Africa, and the 
                                                
18 The ICJ’s 1986 judgment in the Mali-Burkina Faso Frontier Dispute case describes the global 
applicability of uti possidetis as follows: "The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may 
also derive from international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one State from a 
colony of another, or indeed a colonial territory from the territory of an independent State, or one 
which was under protectorate, but had retained its international personality.  There is no doubt that 
the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of State succession derives 
from a general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is expressed in the formula of uti 
possidetis."  (ICJ 1986: ¶ 24) 
19 Ratner (1996) argues, though, that the original doctrine of uti possidetis is most relevant for cases 
of decolonization and should not be applied unquestioningly to the breakup of an established state. 
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colonial powers (or the newly independent states in Africa) may have learned from the Latin 
American experience in ways that avoided many of the problems that arose in the Americas.  As 
with uti possidetis in Latin America, there is some divergence in scholarly opinion on the OAU and 
the avoidance of territorial conflict in Africa.  Kacowicz (1995: 271) and Zacher (2001: 229) 
conclude that African borders -- particularly in West Africa -- have generally been respected, in line 
with uti possidetis; Castellino (2000: 143) similarly concludes that "The doctrine of uti possidetis 
clearly played a vital role in the transition period when the fledgling states emerging out of 
decolonisation were most vulnerable to these forces of separatism and fragmentation." Taking a 
middle line, Touval (1966: 651-654) suggests that Africa had important advantages over Latin 
America in that the transition to independence was more orderly, most borders were already set by 
international treaties, and most borders were not as ill-defined or based on contradictory documents 
-- although numerous grounds for potential problems remain, such as the potential for irredentist 
conflicts over colonial-era borders that divide members of a single ethnic group or tribe.  More 
skeptically, Prescott (1987: 105) notes that the 1964 OAU declaration was meant to prevent the 
emergence of territorial disputes in Africa, but concludes that “Unfortunately, it has not succeeded 
in that intention.”  Further research can help to determine which of these varied characterizations of 
the African situation is most accurate, and to what extent the African experience since independence 
has differed from that of Latin America.  
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Appendix 1:  Territorial Integrity Provisions in Multilateral Treaties 
 
Violent Territorial Integrity Obligations (Rejection of Violent Territorial Challenges) 
League of Nations (1920-1946) 
• Article 10 of League Covenant:  "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve 
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
Members of the League." 
 
Saavedra Lamas Pact / Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (1933-
present; partially replaced by 1948 Pact of Bogotá) 
• Article 2:  "They declare that as between the High Contracting Parties, territorial questions must 
not be settled by violence, and that they will not recognize any territorial arrangement which is not 
obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories that may be 
brought about by force of arms." 
 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1934-present) 
• Article 11:  "The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise 
obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained 
by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, 
or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the 
object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or 
indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily." 
 
United Nations (1945-present) 
• Article 2 (4) of UN Charter:  "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 
 
Organization of American States (1951-present) 
• Article 21 of OAS Charter:  "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even 
temporarily, or military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or 
indirectly, on any grounds whatever.  No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained 
either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized." 
 
ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978-present, although this will eventually be 
superseded by the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security when that comes into effect) 
• Article 1 of 1978 protocol:  "Member States shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from 
the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the 
Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of other Member States." 
• Article 2 of 1978 protocol: "Each Member State shall refrain from committing, encouraging or 
condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of the other Member States." 
• Article 2 of the 1999 protocol:  "Member States reaffirm their commitment to the principles 
contained in the Charters of the United Nations Organization (UNO) and the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as to the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights, particularly the following fundamental principles... 
territorial integrity and political independence of Member States." 
 
SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (2004-present) 
• Article 11: " a) In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, State Parties shall refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
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other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defense against an armed 
attack." 
 
General Territorial Integrity Obligations (Rejection of All Territorial Challenges) 
Locarno Pact / Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (1925-1936) 
• Article 1: "The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner 
provided in the following Articles, the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the 
frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of 
the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 
1919." 
 
Non-Aligned Movement (1961-present) 
• 1955 Principles of Bandung: "2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
nations." 
 
Organization of African Unity / African Union (1963-present) 
• Article 2 of OAU Charter:  "1.  The Organization shall have the following purposes... (c) To 
defend [the African States'] sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and independence" 
• Article 3 of OAU Charter:  "The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 2, 
solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles... 3.  Respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent 
existence." 
• Article 3 of AU Constitutive Act:  "The objectives of the Union shall be to... (b) defend the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States" 
• Article 4 of AU Constitutive Act:  "The Union shall function in accordance with the following 
principles: (b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence" 
 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (1973-present) 
• Charter of the Islamic Conference, Article II:  "The member States decide and undertake that, in 
order to realize the objectives mentioned in the previous paragraph, they shall be inspired and 
guided by the following principles: 
3. Respect of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each member State" 
 
Helsinki Final Act (1975-present) 
• Point III - Inviolability of frontiers:  "The participating states regard as inviolable all one another's 
frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in 
the future from assaulting these frontiers.  Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, 
or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State." 
• Point IV - Territorial integrity of states:  "The participating States will respect the territorial 
integrity of each of the participating States.  Accordingly, they will refrain from any action 
inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the 
territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular 
from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.  The participating States will likewise 
refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect 
measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of 
such measures or the threat of them.  No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as 
legal." 
 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976-present) 
• Article 2:  "In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the 
following fundamental principles... a.  Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations" 
• Article 10:  "Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any 
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activity which shall constitute a treat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial 
integrity of another High Contracting Party." 
 
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (1985-present) 
• Article II:  "1. Cooperation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for 
the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit." 
 
Andean Community (1989-present) 
• Article 12 of Declaration of Galápagos: "The Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Venezuela...  Agree in the following declaration to... 
2. Reaffirm their commitment to secure peace and cooperation in the Subregion and observe in 
their relations the principles on the prohibition of the use or threat of force, on the pacific 
settlement of conflicts, respect for national sovereignty, and compliance with the obligations 
arising from international legal instruments, as well as to abstain from actions against the 
territorial integrity, political independence, or unity of any of the states." 
 
Commonwealth of Independent States (1991-present) 
• Article 3 of CIS Charter:  "For the achievement of the Commonwealth's objectives, the Member 
States shall, proceeding from the universally recognized norms of international law and the Helsinki 
Final Act, organize their relationships in accordance with the following interconnected principles of 
equal value: (...) 
--inviolability of state borders, recognition of existing borders, and rejection of unlawful territorial 
acquisitions; 
--territorial integrity of states and rejection of any actions aimed at dismembering another state's 
territory" 
 
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (1999-present) 
• Article III of Declaration of the Principles Guiding Relations among the CICA Member States:  
"The Member States shall respect the territorial integrity of each other.  They recognize the 
inviolability of state boundaries and therefore they shall refrain at present and in the future from any 
attempt to violate these boundaries.  The Member States shall likewise refrain from making each 
other's territory the subject of military occupation or other direct or indirect use of force in 
contravention of international law, or an object of acquisition by means of such measures or the 
threat of their implementation.  No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legitimate." 
 
GUUAM/GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (2001-present) 
• "Principles of GUUAM Cooperation" in Yalta GUUAM Charter: "Cooperation within the 
GUUAM is based on the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, in 
particular, on the respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in 
domestic affairs of the Member States." 
 
South-East European Cooperation Process (2000-present) 
• "Scope and Principles of the Regional Cooperation" in Bucharest Charter: " The cooperation 
among our countries shall be founded on the UN Charter, on the principle of full observance of the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the states in our region, on the principles of the OSCE and 
the relevant documents of the Council of Europe..." 
• "Objectives and Mechanisms of Cooperation" in Bucharest Charter: " Our political and security 
cooperation serving this purpose shall be focused on: 
--Creating peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the region through reconciliation, recognition 
of the inviolability of the existing international borders and the peaceful resolution of disputes, on 
the basis of international law..." 
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001-present) 
• Article 5 of the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO:  “The States members of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization firmly adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations, the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, equal rights and mutual advantage, resolution of all issues through joint consultations, 
non-interference in internal affairs, non-use or threat of use of military force, and renunciation of 
unilateral military advantage in contiguous areas.” 
 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (2003-present) 
• Preamble of CSTO Charter:  "Seeking to establish favorable and stable conditions for the full 
development of the States Parties to the Treaty and to ensure their security, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity..." 
• Article 3 of CSTO Charter: "The purposes of the Organization are to strengthen peace and 
international and regional security and stability and to ensure the collective defense of the 
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member States..." 
 
ECCAS Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central 
Africa / COPAX Protocol (2000-present) 
• Article 3: "The member states reaffirm their attachment to the principles of the UN Charter, OAU 
Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ECCAS Treaty, notably: 
(d) respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of states; 
(f) inviolability of the borders inherited from colonization" 
 
Notes 
• Dates for each treaty reflect the years when the treaty or institution was in legal effect. 
• Source:  ICOW Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set documentation, 
available at <http://data.icow.org>. 
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Table 1:  Measuring Territorial Integrity Norms 
 
 Average territorial integrity obligations (per state-year): 
 
Historical era Violent  General  Total 
1816-1918 0.00   0.00   0.00 
1919-1945 1.00   0.03   1.03 
1946-1975 1.46   0.37   1.83 
1976-2001 1.49   1.52   3.00 
Total 0.59   0.28   0.86 
 
Note: 
• This table lists the average annual number of territorial integrity treaty obligations of each type 
for each state in the COW interstate system.  Statistical comparisons include one observation per 
year. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
A.  Global Analysis of Conflict over Territory 
 
Variable   Mean (S.D.)  Range   N 
Militarized disputes over territory (1816-2001): 
 All   3.66 (3.92)  0 - 16   186 
 >100 Fatalities  0.35 (0.70)  0 - 4   186 
Territorial changes (1816-2000): 
 Violent   0.63 (1.61)  0 - 13   185 
 Total   2.64 (3.51)  0 - 23   185 
Average territorial integrity obligations (1816-2001): 
 Violent   0.59 (0.68)  0.0 - 1.62  186 
 General  0.28 (0.54)  0.0 - 1.82  186 
 Total   0.86 (1.12)  0.0 - 3.28  186 
 
 
B.  Analysis of Territorial Claims in Latin America 
 
Variable   Mean (S.D.)  Range   N 
Historical period: 
 1848-1921  0.55 (0.50)  0 - 1   1853 
 1922-1950  0.21 (0.41)  0 - 1   1853 
 1951-2001  0.23 (0.42)  0 - 1   1853 
Shared territorial integrity obligations (1816-2001): 
 Violent 0.09 (0.32) 0 - 2 1848 
 Total 1.07 (1.46) 0 - 6 1848 
Territorial salience 7.03 (2.18) 2 - 10 1853 
Recent mil. disputes 0.31 (0.71) 0.0 - 5.4 1853 
Joint democracy 0.07 (0.25) 0 - 1 1853 
Capability imbalance 0.72 (0.12) 0.50 - 0.97 1848 
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Table 3:  Territorial Integrity Norms and Global Conflict Patterns 
 
A. By Temporal Era 
 Militarized Disputes: Territorial Changes: 
 
Variable All Disputes 101+ Fatalities Violent Peaceful 
1919-1945   1.73 (0.90)*   0.33 (0.24)   1.16 (0.72)   1.41 (1.26) 
1946-1975   3.92 (1.42)***   0.11 (0.28)   1.08 (0.99)   1.50 (1.40) 
1976-2001   0.62 (2.51) - 0.09 (0.54)   0.72 (1.46) - 3.27 (2.30) 
States in system   0.04 (0.02)**   .004 (.004) - 0.01 (0.01)   0.03 (0.02)* 
Constant - 0.21 (0.67) - 0.02 (0.14)   0.71 (0.39)*   0.55 (0.62) 
 
 N=186  N=186 N=185 N=185 
 F=46.17*** F=4.88*** F=4.07*** F=8.76*** 
 R2=.56  R2=.11 R2=.07 R2=.16 
 
B. By Treaty Obligations (Violent) 
Variable All Disputes 101+ Fatalities Violent Peaceful 
Average obligations   2.81 (0.71)***   0.17 (0.15)   0.56 (0.44)   1.63 (0.72)** 
States in system   0.02 (0.01)**  .002 (.002) - 0.01 (0.005) - .005 (0.01) 
Constant   0.52 (0.39)   0.10 (0.09)   0.84 (0.20)***   2.01 (0.43)* 
 
 N=186  N=186 N=185 N=185 
 F=76.76*** F=7.06*** F=1.68 F=7.03*** 
 R2=.53  R2=.09 R2=.02 R2=.07 
 
C. By Treaty Obligations (General) 
Variable All Disputes 101+ Fatalities Violent Peaceful 
Average obligations - 8.59 (1.22)*** - 0.58 (0.27)* - 1.65 (0.61)*** - 7.22 (1.67)*** 
States in system   0.14 (0.01)***   0.01 (.003)***   0.02 (0.01)**   0.09 (0.02)*** 
Constant - 3.97 (0.51)*** - 0.20 (0.11)*** - 0.02 (0.26) - 1.58 (0.72)** 
 
 N=186  N=186 N=185 N=185 
 F=111.28*** F=10.09*** F=4.21** F=15.12*** 
 R2=.62  R2=.11 R2=.03 R2=.18 
 
D. By Treaty Obligations (Total) 
Variable All Disputes 101+ Fatalities Violent Peaceful 
Average obligations   1.51 (0.97)   0.06 (0.22)   0.33 (0.67) - 0.11 (0.99) 
States in system   0.02 (0.02)   .003 (.01) - 0.01 (0.01)   0.02 (0.02) 
Constant   0.92 (0.80)   0.11 (0.17)   0.94 (0.46)**   1.57 (0.77)** 
 
 N=186  N=186 N=185 N=185 
 F=57.83*** F=5.51*** F=0.73*** F=4.15** 
 R2=.47  R2=.08 R2=.005 R2=.04 
 
* p  ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01 
Note: 
• The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors for OLS regression. 
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Table 4:  Uti Possidetis and Conflict over Territory between Former Spanish Colonies in 
Latin America 
 
A.  Any militarized disputes 
 Model I Model II  Model III 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Variable (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)  (Robust S.E.) 
1848-1921   0.27 (1.04)       ---      --- 
1922-1950   0.10 (1.06)       ---      --- 
1951-2001   0.78 (1.05)       ---      --- 
Shared Obligations-Violent      ---   0.19 (0.10)**      --- 
Shared Obligations-Total      ---      ---   0.17 (0.08)** 
Territorial salience   0.20 (0.06)***   0.21 (0.07)***    0.21 (0.07)*** 
Recent mil. disputes   0.83 (0.09)***   0.81 (0.09)***    0.81 (0.09*** 
Joint democracy   0.06 (0.41)   0.04 (0.42)  - 0.03 (0.45) 
Capability imbalance - 1.18 (0.90) - 1.01 (0.91)* - 1.03 (0.91) 
Constant - 4.23 (1.26)*** - 4.26 (0.93)***  - 4.21 (0.91)*** 
 
 N: 1848 N: 1848 N: 1848 
 LL:  -369.16 LL:  -369.64  LL:  -369.63 
 X2: 120.90  X2:  115.62 X2:  117.02 
 p < .001 (7 df)  p < .001 (5 df)  p < .001 (5 df) 
 
B.  Militarized disputes with more than 100 fatalities 
 Model I Model II  Model III 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Variable (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)  (Robust S.E.) 
1848-1921      ---✝      ---      --- 
1922-1950   0.89 (0.75)      ---      --- 
1951-2001   0.54 (1.04)       ---      --- 
Shared Obligations-Violent      ---   0.16 (0.28)      --- 
Shared Obligations-Total      ---      ---   0.18 (0.25) 
Territorial salience   0.23 (0.19)   0.24 (0.23)   0.26 (0.24) 
Recent mil. disputes   0.44 (0.24)*   0.50 (0.27)*    0.49 (0.28)* 
Joint democracy      ---✝      ---✝       ---✝ 
Capability imbalance - 7.37 (2.95)** - 7.17 (2.87)**  - 7.14 (2.87)** 
Constant - 2.86 (2.65) - 2.90 (3.20)  - 3.10 (3.33) 
 
 N: 1848 N: 1848 N: 1848 
 LL:  -46.61 LL:  -46.99 LL:  -46.86 
 X2: 12.00 X2:    11.25 X2:  11.80 
 p < .001 (5 df)  p < .001 (4 df)  p < .001 (4 df) 
 
* p  ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01 
✝ The model could not be run accurately with these variables; Stata dropped a number of cases 
whose outcomes were completely determined when these variables were in the model. 
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Table 5:  Uti Possidetis and Conflict over Territory between Former Spanish Colonies in 
Latin America 
 
A.  Any militarized disputes 
 Model I Model II  Model III 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Variable (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)  (Robust S.E.) 
Former Spanish colonies   0.42 (0.19)**   0.29 (0.19)    0.29 (0.19) 
1848-1921 - 0.24 (0.32)       ---      --- 
1922-1950 - 0.52 (0.38)       ---      --- 
1951-2001   0.33 (0.35)       ---      --- 
Shared Obligations-Violent      ---   0.15 (0.07)**      --- 
Shared Obligations-Total      ---      ---   0.14 (0.06)** 
Territorial salience   0.18 (0.04)***   0.18 (0.04)***    0.18 (0.04)*** 
Recent mil. disputes   0.87 (0.08)***   0.88 (0.08)***    0.87 (0.08)*** 
Joint democracy - 0.43 (0.28) - 0.38 (0.27)  - 0.43 (0.27) 
Capability imbalance - 1.29 (0.61)** - 1.33 (0.60)** - 1.32 (0.60) 
Constant - 3.92 (0.69)*** - 4.05 (0.67)***  - 4.06 (0.67)*** 
 
 N: 6021 N: 6021 N: 6021 
 LL:  -730.17 LL:  -735.01  LL:  -734.64 
 X2: 274.60  X2:  262.96 X2:  264.14 
 p < .001 (8 df)  p < .001 (6 df)  p < .001 (6 df) 
 
B.  Militarized disputes with more than 100 fatalities 
 Model I Model II  Model III 
 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient 
Variable (Robust S.E.) (Robust S.E.)  (Robust S.E.) 
Former Spanish colonies - 1.14 (0.46)** -  1.12 (0.44)***  -  1.12 (0.43)*** 
1848-1921      ---✝      ---      --- 
1922-1950   0.45 (0.50)      ---      --- 
1951-2001 - 0.26 (0.70)       ---      --- 
Shared Obligations-Violent      ---   0.08 (0.23)      --- 
Shared Obligations-Total      ---      ---   0.09 (0.23) 
Territorial salience   0.31 (0.08)***   0.33 (0.09)***   0.33 (0.09)*** 
Recent mil. disputes   0.51 (0.22)**   0.53 (0.21)**    0.53 (0.21)** 
Joint democracy - 1.58 (1.13) - 1.57 (1.08) - 1.60 (1.10) 
Capability imbalance - 2.60 (1.46)* - 2.53 (1.50)*  - 2.52 (1.48)** 
Constant - 5.31 (1.63)*** - 5.52 (1.71)*** - 5.54 (1.71)*** 
 
 N: 6021 N: 6021 N: 6021 
 LL:  -149.05 LL:  -149.54 LL:  -149.50 
 X2: 68.97 X2:    64.46 X2:  62.90 
 p < .001 (7 df)  p < .001 (6 df)  p < .001 (6 df) 
 
* p  ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01 
✝ The model could not be run accurately with these variables; Stata dropped a number of cases 
whose outcomes were completely determined when these variables were in the model. 
 
